‘The science’ and the politics
The political side of the Covid response is extremely interesting. As outlined previously, the evidence policymakers had to work on early was very minimal. Mostly, predictions from modelling studies that should not be interpreted for the point estimates (i.e., the exact figures) they predict, but merely as a way to examine possible scenarios while considering the model’s limitations – what is/isn’t being considered within the model. Instead, we got newspaper headlines that focused solely on the big scary numbers from these point estimates alone.
Politics, of course, is not a purely scientific pursuit, it can’t be. It also reflects and responds to public values/perception – politicians need to be voted back in. There is no direct link between politicians and what the collective public think either. There is always some sort of middle-man that can disrupt this signal, which include the press (biased by the views of the owners and advertisers), pollsters (biased by the type of person who is actually willing to answer a survey), and more directly an MP’s direct contact with their constituents (biased by the type of person who goes along to complain to their MP). Not to mention all of the other interests that muddy their political decisions, like lobbyists and others contributing financially to re-election campaigns, etc.
So, we had a lack of evidence, an uncertain and frightened public being fed big scary mortality estimates, and countries left and right starting to react in various ways – mostly by closing borders or locking down. In this situation, I would argue, it was far easier for any politician to be seen to be ‘doing something’ rather than ‘doing nothing’. This is evidenced by the overwhelming majority of countries that ‘did something’ despite this uncertainty, many fairly drastic ‘somethings’, as opposed to the very few, like Sweden, which has been accused of doing too little. At least as a politician you can argue that you tried rather than assumed things would just be OK. It also probably favoured ‘doing something’ later rather than earlier. The evidence was slim remember, and the potential risks (e.g., economic, mental health, public disobedience, political poll hits) would have also been on policymakers’ minds – how much could they potentially be criticised in hindsight, when that re-election campaign rolled around. Finally, some, like Boris Johnson in the UK, were also in the middle of other ongoing public policy battles, ‘getting Brexit done’, which also likely influenced the spectrum of specific policies they could choose. For example, closing international borders hard and early might be particularly effective for a country before the virus arrives (see, e.g. New Zealand and others – at least in the short-term), but it would have been politically toxic at the time to close borders with the EU – just imagine the headlines and protests, and even the difficulty in pursuing the ‘free trade’/ ‘global market’ message they wanted to portray.
Despite, and arguably because of, the lack of evidence, for policymakers it was easier (safer politically) to act, but act late, and to choose policies within their specific political boundaries. Once a path was chosen, it also became paramount for them to prove that they had chosen the correct path. To surround themselves with (only) the scientists who supported the chosen course of action, to call what this group says ‘the science’, and to demonise any questioning of the narrative. Despite both sides theoretically able to argue their position in this evidence-free zone, one side can easily be locked out of the debate when there is consensus amongst the powerful stakeholders (many of whom saw a lot of profit to be gained through the crisis and specific responses too).
Since, as discussed previously, much of the uncertainty still remains today, the predominant narrative can never quite be killed off. You still get definitive statements made, ‘lockdowns work’, without question in the press and even some scientific publications. Even as we now enter the next crisis, an economic crisis with high inflation and cost-of-living, the narratives can survive. Even as the IMF report, this economic crisis is at least partially a lagged spillover from the Covid policies chosen: for instance, lockdowns (disrupting supply, still ongoing in China – the largest manufacturer globally - with their ‘zero-Covid’ strategy), and fiscal stimulus (to protect jobs and wages while economies were forcibly closed). Now, of course, further compounded by the Ukraine invasion. As Paul Krugman recently wrote, “We’re in judgement territory – and that leaves lots of room for argument.”
As I look back on the Covid crisis then, I see a certain amount of inevitability, both in how the policy response and narrative unfolded, and ultimately in terms of the damage of the virus itself – very few non-pharmaceutical policies able to do much at all to stop the spread and with huge costs ultimately to be paid for any marginal effect, at least until vaccines arrived. If we are to improve at all in the next crisis, I think we need better systems to react, including:
· Better forecasting models, democratisation of the assumptions they make and wider (political and public) understanding of their strengths and limits;
· Stronger political accountability to ensure all sides are heard in the debate and any one (or company) that stands to benefit has their input tempered and conflicts of interest clearly displayed;
· Press accountability and business model(s) that incentivise informing
the public rather than fear-porn for clicks;
· System resilience, including healthier and more informed populations at the outset so any fear can be tempered by rational decision-making in the face of uncertainty.